

## PROJECT SUMMARY

The present era is one defined by globalization. And while there is reason to believe that citizens recognize that their lives are affected by the global economy, we know very little about how globalization influences mass attitudes and behavior. What do citizens know about globalization? How does it affect their policy preferences, policy attributions, and vote decisions? Do perceptions of the world economy vary according to social group, and if so, what are the implications of such cleavages for political competition and election results? Ultimately, how does globalization affect policy representation by political elites? No research sufficiently investigates these questions. This omission is surprising in light of a well-developed research program in international and comparative political economy on the effects of global markets for domestic policy outcomes. Contemporary contributors to this research program conclude that democracy in developed welfare states functions no worse and possibly better in today's worldwide economy than in previous times. Evidence supporting these conclusions, however, is only indirect, extrapolated from analyses of highly aggregated political and economic data. More seriously, the macro political-economic analyses prevalent in the literature are devoid of the micro-foundations that link open economies to the workings of representative democracy.

Intellectual Merits: This project proposes the first study of the implications of economic globalization for mass politics in advanced industrial democracies. The objectives are twofold. *First*, breaking from current approaches to the study of globalization's consequences, I propose a new framework for linking globalization and mass politics. Informed by advances in the literatures on collective preferences, voter choice, and policy representation, this reoriented framework promises to redirect the study of the politics of globalization—away from the relationship between aggregate measures of market exposure on policy outcomes and toward a consideration of how citizen perceptions of globalization affect the workings of representative democracy. The framework motivates ten research questions, none of which have been sufficiently addressed in previous studies, and produces a set of propositions to be assessed empirically. *Second*, the project will be the first to develop measures and collect original data to assess mass and elite perceptions of globalization, policymaker control, and democratic performance in comparative perspective. This goal will be achieved by fielding public opinion and expert surveys of electorates and policymakers in seven established democracies varying in their exposure to the world economy and organization of domestic institutions.

Broader Impacts: Results of this project will help determine whether market integration is conducive to democracy, as the current conventional wisdom in political economy research implies, or whether the growth of the economy beyond national borders is costly to health mass politics. Research findings will be broadly disseminated through a project website, archived data and accompanying documentation, and scholarly publications. This will enable scholars in the traditionally bifurcated fields of political economy and of public opinion, parties, and elections to collaborate and assess theories about connections between globalization, policymaking, and representative democracy in ways not previously possible. Graduate students will play a key role in data collection, analysis, and dissemination, activities which will contribute to their training as researchers. Finally, project findings will benefit classroom instruction: While “globalization” is often mentioned in public discourse as a defining feature of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we know little beyond anecdotal accounts of how the world economy influences voter perceptions of democracy and popular sovereignty. Just as scholars of 1990s did much to clarify connections between open markets and policy outcomes, this project will close the gap between hyperbole and what we actually know about globalization and mass politics.

## PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The present era, it is often said, is defined by globalization. Accordingly, a large literature explores the domestic consequences of the integration of markets for goods, services, and capital. Most of this research has focused on important questions of policymaker competency and national policy control. According to the “globalization thesis,” attempts by any single government to pursue strategies for growth and stability which differ from neoliberal prescriptions are likely to fail, undercut by impersonal market actors. Instead, to attract capital governments must engage in a competitive “race to the bottom” where policies converge onto a lowest common denominator characterized by spending cuts, lower taxes, balanced budgets, and a general weakening of the state’s productive and redistributive capacity. From this perspective, the consequences for democracy appear straightforward: By limiting national policy room to maneuver, globalization reduces the efficacy of national policy levers, detracts from popular sovereignty, and presents voters with a set of false choices. No longer limited to the behavior of activists protesting at meetings of the World Bank, IMF, and G8, the direct and indirect effects of global markets are believed to sway election outcomes themselves. Globalization has been cited as contributing to the success of new populist parties and to declining levels of political participation. In 2005 French and Dutch voters resoundingly rejected the European Constitution—a vote broadly viewed as a referendum on further integration.

Yet despite the plausibility of strong and multilayered relationships, research in comparative and international political economy (CPE/IPE) remains focused on the relationship between globalization and objective policy outcomes. The consequences of globalization for political outcomes in general and for mass politics in particular have been neglected. A complete analysis of the consequences of market integration, I argue, must address not only whether national policymakers remain in control of their macroeconomies, but also whether publics can influence and are satisfied with the choices their governments make. This recognition gives rise to several new questions: How does economic globalization affect citizen preferences over policy? Does exposure to the world economy shape how voters selecting among parties in elections? How does operating in an environment characterized by cross-national movement of goods, services, and people affect the incentives of vote-seeking political parties? Ultimately, what effect—positive, negative, or none—does globalization have on policy representation?

While the globalization literature in CPE/IPE has neglected mass politics, the inverse is also true: Although recent developments in the study of citizen policy preferences, popular support, and mass-elite linkages has advanced their fields considerably, none of this research examines how the economy beyond national borders—and the constraints, real or perceived, that it imposes—affects the workings of representative democracy. This project will fill this lacuna by reconsidering mass politics in systems exposed to world markets. Parting from standard causal designs in the field, I draw on developments in the study of public opinion, parties, and elections to motivate present a set of research questions. By doing so, this proposal highlights the need to develop new measures on mass and elite attitudes for testing theoretical predictions on economic globalization’s consequences for citizen policy preferences, citizens’ voting behavior, elite policy positions, and policy representation.

### **Economic Globalization and Democracy: The Current State of Affairs**

Since the rapid increase in commercial and financial globalization during the 1980s and especially 1990s, three separate lines of argument have appeared in the literature on the effects of economic globalization in advanced capitalist societies. The first of these is the *globalization thesis*, which states that by privileging the free movement of capital for investment, employment, and growth, globalization has created a “race-to-the-bottom” in social protections. This perspective contends that social-democratic solutions are unattainable in a world where rules are shaped by

impersonal and unaccountable financial markets. To attract capital, national policies must converge to a neoliberal mix, characterized by spending cuts, lower taxes, balanced budgets and a general weakening of the state's productive and redistributive capacity. Observers have drawn on this logic to paint an uncertain future for independent national policies (e.g., Andrews 1994; Greider 1999; Korpi and Palme 2003; Mishra 1999; Moses 2000; Strange 1996).

A second argument questions the economic and political logic of the globalization thesis. In the tradition Cameron (1978) and Katzenstein (1985), these scholars identify factors that remain integral to the maintenance of distinct national policies. Some point to particular path-dependent trajectories, stemming from pre-World War II bargains between capital and labor and between various producer groups, which insulate states from transnational pressures (Pierson 2001). Others focus on how domestic institutions or welfare-production regimes diffuse global economic forces (Franzese 2002; Swank 2002), or combine with partisan politics to produce specific policy outcomes (Garrett 1998b; Huber and Stephens 2001). As Garrett (1998a, 789) boldly asserts, there is a "virtuous circle between activist government and international openness." This *revisionist thesis* has achieved conventional wisdom status among observers of developed welfare states. And to the extent that this debate on globalization and national policy control has been resolved, mainstream CPE/IPE research has turned to a new set of questions. For some, this means disaggregating economic globalization into its components to see how they differentially affect policy outcomes (e.g., Hicks and Zorn 2005). Others separate policy outcomes to see which are most (or least) susceptible to shocks from the international economy (e.g., Boix 2000; Burgoon 2001). And others, no longer concerned with whether globalization constrains policy room to maneuver, have begun to explore why "race to the bottom" scenarios have failed to materialize (e.g., Basinger and Hallerberg 2004).

A third line of reasoning argues that the observed relationship between globalization and policy responsiveness is neither negative nor positive but spurious. Here, Iversen's work has been influential (Iversen 2005; Iversen and Cusack 2000; Iversen and Wren 1998). Iversen and his collaborators demonstrate that factors associated with structural economic change, not globalization, account for social policy outcomes in post-industrial economies. The most important change in the advanced liberal democracies since the 1970s, argues Iversen, has been the transition from an economy dominated by manufacturing production, which tends to be exposed to international competition, to one dominated by public and private services production, which is mainly non-traded. The implication from this argument—what we might call the "spurious effects" thesis—is that globalization's effects are indirect, filtered through more fundamental structural economic changes (also see Kitschelt 1994; Pontusson 1995; Rueda 2005 and, from a different perspective, Clark 2003).


However, while making different claims about the consequences of international economic integration, the globalization thesis, revisionist thesis, and spurious effects thesis share a common causal framework. This framework employs one or more objective measures of economic globalization (such as trade or capital flows expressed as share of GDP) as exogenous variables affecting economic performance outcomes (such as unemployment or growth) or policy outcomes (such as public spending, social transfers, lending rates, or tax burdens).<sup>1</sup> Many analysts consider the extent to which institutional or partisan factors play a conditioning role. Though stripped of detail, Figure 1 sufficiently represents how the existing CPE/IPE scholarship conceives of the effects of globalization on national political systems (e.g., Basinger and Hallerberg 2004; Boix 2000; Burgoon 2001; Clark 2003; Clark and Hallerberg 2000; Garrett 1998b; Hays 2003; Hicks and Zorn 2005; Iversen 2005; Iversen and Cusack 2000; Rodrik 1997; Swank 2002).

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<sup>1</sup> These measures are not strictly exogenous, of course. Figure 1 could also include a feedback loop reconnecting policy outcomes to globalization. This would mischaracterize the current state of affairs, however, since the political science literature generally proceeds as though globalization is exogenously determined (exceptions are Adsera and Boix 2002; Bernhard and Leblang 2006; Mosley 2002).

Some analysts extend their regression analyses of policy outcomes to draw inferences for mass politics within nation-states. This is represented by the right-hand side of Figure 1—connected by dashed lines—denoting public preferences over policy outcomes, the choice among competing parties in elections, the behavior of political elites, and policy representation. For example, Swank (2002) argues that those regimes with formal institutions and interest group organizations which promote the “dispersion of policy-making authority” enable pro-welfare-state interests to resist neoliberal reforms attendant on globalization. The implication (left unexamined) of Swank’s argument is that since the majority of the public supports generous social policies, globalization is not damaging to healthy mass politics—at least in countries with a particular mix of political institutions.

**Figure 1. A Standard Framework linking Globalization to Domestic Politics**



A joint consideration of these perspectives from mainstream CPE/IPE with research on public opinion, parties, and elections presents several puzzles. The globalization thesis, for example, contends that transnational markets undermine the capacity of national politicians to adopt autonomous policies. But models of political party competition would predict this conclusion applies only if market integration creates incentives for party proposals to diverge from their supporters’ preferences (or the median voter’s) in policy space. Or take the revisionist perspective. These arguments contend that open markets, if anything, facilitate representative democracy. However, this should be the case only if the public favors the more redistributive policies ostensibly facilitated by exposure to the world economy, an assumption many students of public opinion would assert accords too much to public interest and knowledge in politics. And finally, the claim of a spurious relationship between the world economy and policy outcomes, even if true, cannot be extended to assert a similar non-relationship between globalization and the policy positions of citizens and elites. Rather, what we know about the importance of subjective indicators for mass political support (e.g., MacKuen *et al.* 1992; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001) pushes us to examine how and whether perceptions of globalization affect mass politics in democracies.

This study confronts these puzzles by considering the effect of globalization on mass politics. Doing so requires advancing the study of the political economy of globalization in two ways: *First*, we need a new theoretical framework—simply adding more conditioning factors to the standard framework in Figure 1 will not suffice. Informed by advances in public opinion, vote choice, and policy representation, I present a framework which redirects the study of globalization away from connections between aggregate measures of market exposure and policy outcomes and toward a consideration of how perceptions of globalization by political actors—both citizens and elites—affect the workings of representative democracy. The framework motivates ten research questions, none of which have been sufficiently addressed in previous studies, and produces a set of propositions to be assessed empirically.

*Second*, we need new research designs. Currently approaches to inquiry in CPE/IPE are unable to discern whether and how globalization influences fundamental questions of representative

democracy. Specifically, we must move beyond the current practice of inferring to individuals from highly aggregated cross-sectional—time-series models of policy outcomes. Political scientists have long been familiar with the perils of inferring from the aggregate to the individual, and vice-versa (e.g., Kramer 1983). And, as Powell (2004, 96) notes, cross-national comparisons of objective policy outcomes is an “extremely dubious” means of assessing the quality of democracy, “even if we could assume that all citizens everywhere straightforwardly favor a goal such as economic growth.” The best way to understand the effects of globalization is to “acknowledge the limitations of the kind of cross-national quantitative research that dominates the literature” (Brune and Garrett 2005, 419).<sup>2</sup> Yet no existing source contains data on economic globalization as it relates to the foundational linkages between world markets, citizens, and political parties. By developing a new set of measures at the micro level, the proposed project takes these considerations seriously in ways that previous research has not.

These two advances—a new theoretical framework and a new research design—*will enable us for the first time to explore questions about the consequences of economic globalization for democracy*. What effect does globalization have on perceptions of policy control? Does globalization affect the voter’s selection among competing parties? To what extent do policies designed to facilitate market integration contribute to voter disaffection? Do voters believe that world markets constrain party competition and place governments, in Friedman’s (1999) words, in a “golden straightjacket”? How do political elites, intent on maximizing votes and minimizing blame, manage globalization? Do incentives to highlight or de-emphasize globalization vary according to party type? Most broadly, do global markets affect the nature of political representation, causing voters to seek more *substantive*—to borrow from Pitkin (1967)—forms of representation from local or supranational, rather than national, levels of governance?<sup>3</sup>

### **Globalization and Democracy: A Multistage Framework of Mass Politics**

Reflecting a new theoretical approach, this project is organized around three components, or stages: citizen policy preferences, citizens’ choice of representatives in elections, and the policy positions of political elites. As shown in Figure 2, these three components together provide a framework for mass politics in democracies (see Figure 2). A fourth box for policy outcomes provides a common point of reference to the standard framework in Figure 1.<sup>4</sup> This organizing framework builds on recent discussions of the quality of democracy by Powell (2000; 2004) and Schedler (2002) as informed by Dahl (1971) and Riker (1982). I take each of these components in turn below. Direct consideration of citizens’ policy attitudes, citizens’ voting behavior, and parties’

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
<sup>2</sup> As one indication of this domination, Beck and Katz’s (1995) article on time series-cross section methodology, the workhorse data analytic technique in empirical studies in CPE/IPE, ranks as the most cited APSR article published since 1985 (Beck forthcoming).

<sup>3</sup> A word about the boundaries of the project is in order. First, my focus is on *economic* globalization, by which I mean trans-border “flows of goods, services, and capital, and the information and *perceptions* that accompany market exchange” (Keohane and Nye 2000, 4; emphasis mine). A consideration of the many cultural and political phenomena which have come to be associated with “globalization” is beyond the scope of this study. Second, as regards the dependent variable, I am not proposing a study on the effect of globalization on democracy or democratization (e.g., Li and Reuveny 2003), nor do I propose to examine its consequences for mass satisfaction for democracy, a much-maligned concept (Canache *et al.* 2001). Likewise, this study is not intended to examine the determinants of public support for free trade, foreign investment, or worker insecurity, all questions which have been the focus of other studies (e.g., Baker 2005; Hainmuller and Hiscox 2006; Kaltenthaler *et al.* 2004; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Mughan *et al.* 2003; Scheve and Slaughter 2004). Rather, I focus on the core features of policy representation, as conveyed in Figure 1.

<sup>4</sup> The intention would be that the two frameworks could ultimately be placed together to assess how each set of factors—institutions and government partisanship, as in Figure 1, or citizen and elite behavior, as in Figure 2—contribute to policy outcomes in open economies.

policy positions produce ten questions about the consequences of economic globalization for mass politics—questions which, to date, remain unaddressed.

**Figure 2. A Multistage Framework of Mass Politics**



**Stage 1: Citizen Policy Preferences.** The logical starting position for any study of how democracy works is with the public’s collective policy preferences. Three questions must be addressed:

1. *What do citizens know about globalization?*
2. *How do beliefs about globalization affect citizens’ policy preferences?*
3. *How do beliefs about globalization affect citizens’ policy attributions?*

The first task is to ask how much citizens know about globalization. Much evidence supports the view that some level of knowledge is necessary to form policy judgments (Althaus 2003), to evaluate performance outcomes (Duch *et al.* 2000), and to choose candidates for office (Bartels 1996) to behave consistently with one’s “fully-informed” preferences. Thus, it would not be surprising to find that deficiencies in the level of information—particularly over something as complex and multifaceted as the world economy—affect the collective preferences of the electorate. Yet the sophistication of the electorate has been all but ignored by the CPE/IPE scholarship. The reason for this neglect might be an assumption that we already know the answer: Opinions about the world economy—much like those assumed of foreign policy attitudes—are ill-informed for all but a very small segment of the population.<sup>5</sup> This means public preferences pertaining to the world economy are noisy, providing few incentives for politicians to heed public sentiment. Rational elites should instead be attentive to more specific interests, such as international business or banking interests (Lindblom 1977; Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988). Consistent with this view of uninformed citizens is that in order for the public to have meaningful opinions about the world economy, the issues must be framed by elites who share their political predispositions (Zaller 1992). If true, this predicts that the public’s ignorance on global economic matters undermines the functioning of our multistage framework of mass politics and casts doubt on revisionist claims on the compatibility of globalization and healthy mass democracy.

A more optimistic perspective, associated with scholars like Popkin (1991), Page and Shapiro (1992), and Lupia and McCubbins (1998), contends that through the use of cues and/or opinion aggregation, mass publics act *as if* they are fully informed on matters of policy. The implication is that the public is capable of sending the clear and informed signals necessary for responsive

<sup>5</sup> There is some survey evidence to support this position. For example, a 2000 *Washington Post*-Harvard University survey of Americans found that 57% said they understood the meaning of the phrase “globalization of the world economy.” Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) and others, however, have shown that such subjective knowledge measures are beset by problems. I am aware of no study that measures citizens’ objective knowledge their nation’s integration in the world economy.

policymaking. Applied to the study of globalization, this alternative perspective predicts that while most citizens may know little about the world economy, they can—through work experiences, group affiliations, and the media—construct reasonably accurate summary evaluations on the subject consistent with their interests and values (see Scheve and Slaughter 2001). We need a study to tell us which of these views comports with reality.

This brings us to Question 2: Does knowledge of international economic integration affect citizens' policy preferences on the economic, social, and foreign policy issues that shape political debates? If mass perceptions about globalization are, as we might expect, noisy, then the answer should be no. Yet arguments about the policy room to maneuver suggest a relationship between national dependence on world markets and the costs of public policies, particularly those involving the macroeconomy. If, for example, the removal of restrictions on capital flows makes investment funds more sensitive to domestic tax levels, then we might predict reduced levels of support for funding a large welfare-state. Perceptions of economic openness might reduce public demands for policy action either because citizens recognize a decline in national policymaker authority or because they recognize their personal welfare depends more on the health of world markets than on their national governments.<sup>6</sup>

By linking knowledge levels to preferences we can assess whether the public's collective preferences over policy would be different if citizens were better informed about globalization than they presently are. We know, for example, that majorities of citizens in many democracies continue to support social entitlement programs (Boeri *et al.* 2001; Brooks and Manza 2006). Revisionists draw on this stylized fact to support arguments that, since trade and capital flows have little effect on many components of social spending, economic globalization remains compatible with preferences for continued spending on health care, pensions, and other social services. This assumes, however, that citizens recognize which policies are in their best interest—an assumption questioned by shown to be false by ample evidence showing low levels of political sophistication. But what if citizens were better informed about the reach of global markets, as may be the case in some countries now and stands to be the case in the future? Would this change their policy preferences? Public opinion data collected for this project will enable us to investigate this question for the first time.

Question 3 raises the issue of policy attributions. Though tied closely to room to maneuver debates, researchers rarely investigate how the world economy affects what the public demands from their own governments relative to other entities such as private actors, global market forces, or regional and international organizations. The available evidence hints that citizens no longer hold politicians responsible for the range of outcomes they once did. For example, in 1974 over 90% citizens in Britain, Germany, Italy, and Sweden believed that it was their government's responsibility to provide for job security. By 1996 fewer than seven in ten in these countries held such beliefs.<sup>7</sup> This contrasts with public support for spending on social policies—health care and pensions—which has remained stable and high over the past thirty years.<sup>8</sup> Does global interdependence contribute to these trends? And recent experimental evidence, reported in Table 1, shows that many US citizens identify “national and international business cycles” as responsible for national economic conditions instead of domestic policymakers.

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<sup>6</sup> Using aggregate time-series data, I show elsewhere that exposure to international trade and capital flows affects what sort of policies citizens demand from the government (Hellwig forthcoming).

<sup>7</sup> Data are from the Political Action study and the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) Role of Government II survey. It should be possible to see whether such trends have continued once data from the 2006 ISSP Role of Government III survey are released.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*; Boeri *et al.* 2001. Eurobarometer surveys consistently show that voters are more likely to support joint national-European Union policy decision-making in economic areas compared with social policy areas, where solid majorities prefer policy to be decided at the national level alone.

It seems clear that not accounting for extra-national factors in responsibility attributions (as in Peffley and Williams 1985; Rudolph 2003) produces overly optimistic conclusions about the degree of policy control maintained by national policymakers, particularly the chief executive. These changes to policy attributions, we would predict, serve to undermine democratic accountability and policy responsiveness: If a majority of citizens assign policy responsibility to actors *other than elected officials*, then it would not be rational for voters to punish governments for poor outcomes or for governments to make policies with the public's interests in mind. Testing this prediction in cross-national perspective requires collecting data as proposed below.

**Table 1. Who is Responsible for National Economic Conditions in the United States?<sup>9</sup>**

|   | Control:<br>No business<br>cycle response<br>option | Treatment:<br>business cycle<br>response<br>option |
|---|---|--|
| 1. Congress                                   | 32%   | 21   |
| 2. President                                  | 33  | 14   |
| 3. Working People                             | 8   | 10   |
| 4. Business People                            | 27  | 21   |
| 5. National and International Business Cycles | --  | 33   |

**Stage 2: Citizens' Voting Behavior.** The framework's second stage pertains to how citizens select their representatives at the polls. Four questions are addressed:

4. *How does globalization structure vote choice?*
5. *How does globalization affect retrospective performance-based voting?*
6. *How does globalization affect prospective policy-based voting?*
7. *How does globalization affect non-policy voting?*

Question 4 lies at the heart of how citizen preferences and elite policy proposals are transmitted into the choices provided by national elections. Powell (2004) identifies three factors that affect the utility of elections for structuring choices: citizens' ability to acquire and use information, the coherence of elite policy proposals, and the range of alternatives provided by the system. The first of these is taken up the first stage on citizen preferences, while the second is a function of party behavior. The lion's share of current research on elections and voter choice, however, addresses the third factor. Powell (2000; 2006) shows that electoral and party systems affect the extent to which elections provide voters with a set of alternative policy emphases and prescriptions. Providing a wider range of alternatives, proportional systems are shown to produce outcomes closer to the median voter than majoritarian systems, even after accounting for post-election bargaining and coalition formation (for a similar argument, see Lijphart 1999). Missing in Powell's and others' stories, however, are considerations of other factors—contextual or otherwise—which may affect the range of credible policy alternatives provided by competing parties. For example, it may be of little use to be given a range of alternatives over macroeconomic policy if, due to constraints attributed to globalization, parties in government have little leeway to influence interest rates or chart a new course for fiscal policy.

Evidence from existing public opinion surveys indicates that citizens believe globalization binds the options of national policymakers, regardless of how domestic institutions disperse policy-making authority. A 2001 poll of citizens in 15 European countries, for example, found that twice as

<sup>9</sup> Data are from a February 2005 NSF-funded telephone-based survey experiment of American adults (Freeman 2005). Cells report percent responses to "Please tell me who you feel is most responsible for the economic conditions in the United States in the past few years?"

many agreed with the statement “globalization cannot be controlled by governments” as disagreed with it (Christensen 2003). And, as Table 2 shows, there also exists considerable cross-national variation regarding citizen perceptions of their government’s policy room to maneuver given the global economy. What factors account for these differences? Does globalization, in Powell’s (2004) words, “subvert” the policy alternatives presented to the voter in elections?

**Table 2. How Much Influence does the National Government have in a Global Economy?**<sup>10</sup>

|                            | France<br>1997 | Great Britain<br>2001 | United States<br>2005 |
|----------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| A great deal / Quite a lot | 44%            | 55                    | 90                    |
| Not very much / hardly any | 56             | 45                    | 10                    |
| N                          | 2866           | 2260                  | 132                   |

Questions 5 through 7 ask how globalization conditions—moderates, magnifies, or otherwise alters—traditional determinants of voter choice. As noted, existing work on the bases of voter choice all but ignores the international economy.<sup>11</sup> Recent research nonetheless provides tools to guide how this might be accomplished. Researchers have begun to examine the relative importance of different factors for determining party choice. Examples include studies which compare the magnitude of the effects of the economy and issues on election outcomes (Alvarez *et al.* 2000; Blais *et al.* 2004) and those that combine spatial models of voting with include non-policy motivations (Adams *et al.* 2005). Others have gained insights from how contextual factors shape the effect of individual-level phenomena, including economic perceptions (Duch and Stevenson 2006), issue voting (Kedar 2005), and partisan attachments (Huber *et al.* 2005). This project will draw on both of these advancements.

Questions 5 and 6 pertain to retrospective performance voting and prospective issue voting. Regarding the former, research has focused on how economic performance affects vote choice and election results. For the industrial democracies of the west, Keynesian frameworks for government intervention and their monetarist alternatives implied that national policymakers could influence the direction of national economies for much of the postwar era. In recent years, however, external product demand pressures, price levels from abroad, and shocks from commodity and financial markets have influenced larger and larger segments of state activity. These global developments should cause many voters to question the credibility of government control over macroeconomic policy levers. If voters believe opportunities for policy manipulation have narrowed, then we would expect they will reduce the weight they assign to performance factors such as perceptions of national

<sup>10</sup> The question is worded as “In today’s worldwide economy, how much influence do you think [American/British] governments have on [America’s/Britain’s] economy, a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or hardly any?” The French wording differs slightly: “In your opinion, does globalization still leave the French government with a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or hardly any room to maneuver in the economy?” Sources are Freeman (2005) for the United States, Heath *et al.* (2002) for Britain and CEVIPOF (2001) for France. Missing values and “don’t knows” not reported.

<sup>11</sup> Exceptions are limited to my own work (Hellwig 2001; 2006a; Hellwig and Samuels forthcoming) and to an article by Fernández-Albertos (2006) which, like Hellwig (2001), examines how objective indicators of trade openness moderates the relationship between economic perceptions and selecting political incumbents. I am aware of no study which examines how globalization affects other aspects of voter choice or how it affects decisions to select non-incumbent parties. Critically, no research has examined the role of subjective globalization perceptions on party choice, yet is subjective factors rather than objective measures, which we would expect to matter the most for public perceptions (on the salience of subjective performance evaluations, see, among others, Clarke and Stewart 1995; MacKuen *et al.* 1992; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001).

economic conditions.<sup>12</sup> Likewise, if voters think market integration reduces the credibility of domestic policy levers—regardless of which party controls them—then we would expect that party positions on economic issues have little bearing on the voter’s decision.

But retrospective evaluations and prospective issue orientations are both multidimensional. Regarding the former, politicians may be held to accounts for performance outcomes in non-economic domains, such as welfare provisions, crime, or level of public corruption. As for the latter, voters tend to group issue considerations into at least two dimensions—one pertaining to the role for the state in the market and the other to non-economic issues such as preferences toward authority, the environment, minority rights, and cultural diversity (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Hooghe *et al.* 2002; Kitschelt 1994). If rational voters shift their bases of evaluation from factors over which policymakers have little control to those which they continue to have an impact, we would expect globalization to not reduce by increase the salience of retrospective performance voting for non-economic outcomes. Similarly, it should increase the role of the party proximity on non-economic issues as voters compensate in search for more relevant bases to choose among competing elites.

A consideration of the constraints associated with globalization leads to two sets of predictions: First, voters who perceive higher levels of market integration will suppress the role of economic performance and their preferred positions on economic policy and instead emphasize government performance and party positions on non-economic matters. Second, we should see less economic-based voting and more non-economic based policy voting in economies more dependent on world markets. If supported with data, both sets of predictions would considerably change current thinking about the bases of voter choice.

Finally, as regards Question 7, an influential line of scholarship on parties and voting emphasizes the importance of non-policy factors. These “valence” issues—or party leaders’ non-policy related reputations with respect to competence, integrity, and charisma—have been shown to affect party support above and beyond preference congruence or performance evaluations (Adams *et al.* 2005; Groseclose 2001; Schofield and Sened 2006). While some contend that valence factors have always been important (Clarke *et al.* 2004), others argue that valence has taken on increased meaning as parties have converged in their positions on policy (Green forthcoming; Hellwig 2006c). If true, might the growing role of non-policy factors be linked to growing perceptions of interdependence? It stands to reason that, when confronted with a situation hostile to policy activism, voters will rely more heavily on attributes such as personal appeals, charisma, and other psychological attachments for basing her decision.

**Stage 3: Parties’ Policy Positions.** The final stage in our framework considers the role of political elites. While the public opinion literature today contains a greater appreciation for the role of elite cues in mass politics, little research examines how the world economy shapes elite strategies.<sup>13</sup> Three questions demand our attention:

8. *Do political elites have coherent preferences over globalization?*
9. *What explains elite positions on issues related to the world economy?*
10. *How does globalization affect policy representation?*

Question 8 pertains to the existence (or “strength”) of elite positions on globalization, Question 9 to their formation, and Question 10 to their consequences for representative democracy.

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<sup>12</sup> This extends the analyses in Hellwig (2001) in two important ways, to consider support for non-incumbent parties, and to consider the effects of subjective perceptions of economic globalization.

<sup>13</sup> Two related lines of inquiry bear indirectly on the question of globalization and elite behavior: studies which examine how elites use the rhetoric of globalization to limit choices and build support for otherwise unpopular initiatives (e.g., Hay and Rosamond 2002; Schmidt 2002) and studies which examine party positions on European integration, an issue which is related but far from identical to economic globalization (e.g., Evans 1999; Hooghe *et al.* 2002).

As with citizens' preferences, an examination of elite positions begins with their coherence. Proponents of disciplined parties advocate parties which provide voters with a choice by taking distinct, well-defined positions on the key issues of the day. The more closely parties approximate this ideal, the more likely they are to offer meaningful choices for the voters. Much evidence supports the view that parties do indeed provide a menu of coherent positions on many key policy issues, in where parties are weak and undisciplined, as in the United States (Aldrich 1995, ch. 6). The disciplined parties story, however, may not comport with positions on globalization issues. These issues—by which I mean positions on free trade, the movement of peoples (immigration), and restrictions on foreign investment and capital flows—are more likely characterized by high levels of intra-party disagreement. Most research on elite preferences on international issues examines roll call voting in the U.S. Congress. Research on multilateral trade agreements (Bailey 2001; Box-Steffensmeier *et al.* 1997), funding international organizations (Broz and Hawes 2006) and responding to international crises (Broz 2005) has found that partisanship plays little role in the development of positions on international issues. Instead, better predictors of policymaker behavior are the distributional effects on the legislators' districts. Since representatives' preferences over these issues are not well-rooted in party cues but crosscut lines of party cleavage, individual members of Congress have much leeway. We might predict that as the world economy becomes more central to political debate in the U.S. and elsewhere, the share of issues which lie at the heart of parties' core beliefs—what Carmines and Stimson (1989) call “easy” issues—may shrink in salience and number.

Do findings from the U.S. Congress generalize to other cases, research designs, and levels of analysis? Are parties in parliamentary democracies also divided by preferences on international issues, or does party discipline make for more coherent positions? While scant research looks into these questions, studies of party positions on European integration may provide clues for what to expect. European Community studies initially painted a picture of member state publics as permissive on matters of integration. But as Europe has become more salient for more citizens, parties have been forced to develop positions on the issue. This research yields two conclusions of interest: First, in most member states the axis of policy competition on Europe cut across the dominant left-right divide. Second, the onset of a salient integration issues has meant that, for most parties on the center-left and center-right, positions on Europe are not constrained by partisanship, implying higher levels of intra-party dissent on integration relative to party-defining issues like social welfare (Evans 1999; Hix and Lord 1997; Hooghe *et al.* 2002).

Our final considerations pertain to the determinants of elite positions and to elite responsiveness on matters of globalization (Questions 9 and 10). These questions address an apparent puzzle: on the one hand, assumed low levels of public knowledge about globalization (see Stage 1) should give parties little incentive to respond to the median voter, suggesting poor policy representation on globalization issues. On the other hand, the absence of partisan constraints implies that politicians are also free to advance positions unencumbered by their party's core policy issues. This second perspective, which is consistent with current thinking in mainstream CPE/IPE, suggests that governments do a good job representing public interests, even when operating within the constraints of a worldwide economy.

I will confront this puzzle with the aid of the literature on representational linkages across issue types (Bailey and Brady 1998; Hill and Hurley 1999; Hurley and Hill 2003; Miller and Stokes 1963; Wlezien 1995; 2004). Carmines and Stimson's work on racial issues illustrates how issues can be transformed from “hard,” meaning sufficiently complex to prevent the public from influencing elite positions, to “easy,” or where party positions are distinguishable by citizens. Examining policy representation more specifically, Hill and Hurley (1999) highlight a relationship between issue type and the direction of representational linkages. For party-defining issues, citizen positions both influence and are influenced by elite positions. Hard issues exhibit no influence in either direction. Issues classified as neither party defining nor hard but salient exhibit a one-way mass-to-elite linkage.

More recently, Hurley and Hill (2003) have made the generalized their representational schema to argue that expectations about the influence of citizen preferences on elite positions is a function of two attributes of the issue—its complexity and its relationship to lines of partisan cleavage.<sup>14</sup>

I intend to draw on Hurley and Hill's theory of representational linkages to answer the question of where party issue positions come from. More fundamentally, I assess whether parties are responsive to the public on globalization, and whether perceptions of pervasive market integration positively or negatively affect policy linkages. Issue complexity gives vote-seeking elites much leeway. To the extent that globalization issues fit this characterization, elite positions should be a function of factors other than constituency preferences, such as cues from positions on other issues. Whether partisan cues shape positions on globalization, however, is unclear. In most advanced industrial societies, positions on the issue of state's role in the economy—corresponding to the dominant left-right ideological divide—provides a strong set of cues for anchoring the party on related issue lines. If party positions on globalization issues are correlated with this dominant cleavage line, then globalization can be classified as party defining and Hurley and Hill's predictions should apply (see footnote 14). However, in some contexts these issues may become less complex in the eyes of the electorate. When this is the case elite behavior party behavior will be determined in part by the distributional effects of globalization felt in their constituencies. Still a third possibility is that blame-avoiding politicians deliberately obfuscate and cast globalization as a complex phenomenon which regular citizens are incapable of fully understanding. Here we would expect no linkages connecting elite to mass.<sup>15</sup> Unlike previous political economy efforts conducted at the aggregate level, the data collected as part of this project will allow examination of these issues for the first time.

### **From Theory to Data: Some Empirical Propositions**

Compared to approaches common in mainstream CPE/IPE, a consideration of globalization's consequences for democracy within a mass politics framework potentially leads to different answers for the policy room to maneuver, for popular sovereignty, and for policy responsiveness. The above section identified ten research questions which demand our attention. As highlighted above, these questions give rise to several predictions, including but not limited to the following propositions:

- Mass perceptions of economic globalization affect public preferences by reducing mass demands for policy solutions in domains directly susceptible to world market pressures and increasing demands in domains unaffected by world markets.
- Economic globalization reduces the probability of attributing responsibility for policy outcomes—be they good or bad—to national political actors. In doing so, exposure to the international economy weakens accountability ties between national policymakers and the public.
- Subjective perceptions of economic globalization
  - a) reduce the salience of economic determinants of the vote and of election outcomes and
  - b) increase the salience of non-economic determinants of the vote and of election outcomes.
- Economic globalization, or perceptions thereof, increases the importance of valence issues (non-policy related reputations with respect to competence, integrity, and charisma) on party choice.

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<sup>14</sup> Issues that are simple but cut across lines of party cleavage conform to standard one way mass to elite linkages. Issues that are complex and crosscutting exhibit no such linkages in either direction. Simple, party defining issues should exhibit reciprocal linkages. Finally, issues that are simultaneously complex and party defining should exhibit one-way elite to mass linkages.

<sup>15</sup> See Hellwig and Samuels (forthcoming). An excellent discussion of blame avoidance is Weaver (1986).

- Party positions are less coherent on globalization issues compared to traditional economic and social issues.
- The degree and direction of policy representation on globalization issues (and on issues affected by globalization) is positively affected by the sophistication of the electorate and the coherency of party positions.

If support is found for these propositions, we can conclude that current perspectives associated with the revisionist and spurious effects theses have underestimated the adverse consequences of globalization for advanced industrial democracies. Failure to find empirical support for these propositions, on the other hand, will bolster pro-globalization voices in national politics. In either case, results will make a significant contribution by specifying the multifaceted effects of economic openness for national politics (see Broader Impacts below).

### **Research Design**

Addressing research questions and testing propositions will require collecting original data on mass publics and on party elites. Thanks to the efforts of the Program on International Policy Attitudes, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, the International Social Survey Program, and the World Value Survey, data now exist on attitudes toward trade liberalization and on worker insecurity, some of which is available for secondary analyses. Yet no existing data set contains a satisfactory battery of questions on economic globalization as it relates to the foundational linkages between international markets, citizens, and political parties. But it is precisely these linkages that motivate the macro political-economic analyses commonplace in CPE/IPE. Data limitations mean that no previous work—either at the macro or micro level—is capable of addressing the linkages in the multistage model of mass politics. Accordingly, I will field surveys and collect data on mass *and* elite attitudes through representative surveys of national publics and expert surveys of political parties.

Data collection efforts will enable me (and subsequent researchers) to perform analyses on the relationship between economic globalization and political behavior across different democracies for the first time. These analyses include developing valid knowledge scales on globalization (as in Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Mondak 2001), simulating respondents' full-information preferences over policy (Althaus 2003) and party choice (Bartels 1996), assessing responsibility attributions (Rudolph 2003; 2006), economic voting (Duch and Stevenson 2006), determining the effect of mass-elite proximity on party choice (Alvarez and Nagler 1998), assessing the determinants of elite policy preferences (Hooghe *et al.* 2002), and evaluating representational linkages (Hurley and Hill 2003).

The current practice in the globalization literature is to test hypotheses about the effect of market openness on policy outcomes by leveraging cross-national differences.<sup>16</sup> Public opinion research, on the other hand, typically draws conclusions from a single case. In-depth analysis of citizens and parties in a single country affords the researcher the opportunity to explore issues such as citizen knowledge, voting behavior, and party motivations in great detail but comes at a cost of achieving variance in institutions, party systems, and histories. And, as hinted by the survey marginals in Table 2, publics in different countries may well be differently affected by perceptions of globalization. I therefore advocate a multi-country study, yet one which still provides sufficient degrees of freedom at the individual level. This design will enable us to examine whether and how differences across individuals affect empirical propositions, thus engaging the literatures in public opinion on heterogeneity (e.g., Duch *et al.* 2000; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) At the same time, it will facilitate the combining of subjective factors (such perceptions of globalization and policy/performance outcomes) with objective ones (like individual-level factors such as income and

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<sup>16</sup> Kittel (1999) shows that most of the variance to be explained in the workhorse time-series—cross-section models employed in comparative political economy comes from the cross-sections, not from pooling them over time.

occupation and contextual factors like political institutions and objective levels of economic openness), to compare their explanatory purchase.

**Case Selection.** Cases are selected to achieve variation in three factors. The first is exposure to the world economy. Does globalization affect mass policy preferences, voting behavior, and policy representation in small, open states more than in countries with large domestic markets? The second factor is political institutions. Electoral rules and party systems have been found to affect the congruence between public preferences and government policies, the capacity of voters to attribute policy responsibility, and satisfaction with democracy. The third is variation in welfare-state regimes. Social insurance systems work to separate politics from the market. In doing so, many contend that large welfare-states insulate citizens from the risks of openness (Garrett 1998b; Rodrik 1997). Furthermore, the influential “varieties of capitalism” perspective posits that the organization of firms, industries, and the state produces welfare regimes which operate according to different logics (Hall and Soskice 2001).

Accordingly, I propose to collect data from seven democracies: Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These cases provide variation on each of these factors. OECD democracies vary widely in terms of objective degree of exposure to world markets (i.e., compare small open states like Netherlands and Sweden with the larger domestic markets of the United States and Germany), historical engagement with the world economy (compare traditionally open Britain to more insular France, for example), and membership in regional organizations (most notably the EU and the Eurozone, to which France, Germany and the Netherlands belong while Sweden and the UK remain outside). Electoral institutions, party systems, and legislative rules in Britain and Canada grant politicians considerable control over policy levers. In contrast, institutions in France (cohabitation) and the Netherlands (multiparty coalitions) make policymaking attributions more difficult. Finally, these cases vary in terms of welfare-state regime. In terms of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) influential classification, cases include prototypical examples of social democratic (Sweden), conservative (Germany) and liberal regimes (the U.S.).

**The Public Opinion Survey.** I will field nationally representative sample surveys of 1000 respondents in each of the seven countries. Each survey will include approximately 15 closed-ended items (plus demographics) and take approximately 10 minutes to administer via telephone.<sup>17</sup> To save costs and ensure a high level of uniformity, surveys will be administered as part of multi-country omnibus survey. Proposals have been obtained from three international organizations with substantial experience and strong reputations for doing high quality public opinion surveys: IFOP, Ipsos-MORI, and TNS-Sofres. Of these, IFOP cost estimates are the most competitive. I will work with IFOP to translate the instrument into native languages. Each survey instrument will be back-translated and readjusted accordingly (Breslin 1970). Surveys will be administered locally in each country by native-speaking interviewers and local supervising staff and coordinated by the survey organization in close consultation with the PI. Respondents will be identified through random sampling techniques. Surveys will be stratified within per region in each country to ensure that geographical coverage is consistent with actual population.

The questionnaire is designed to develop valid and reliable measures of the concepts included in the theoretical framework. It includes five sections: a) evaluations of economic and non-economic policy performance, b) respondent issue positions, c) perceptions of policy attributions and policy efficacy in the global economy, d) objective knowledge questions about the world economy, and e) left-right self-placement, partisanship, vote intentions, and demographics. While some of these questions have been asked in previous studies, no existing survey, even for a single country, includes

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<sup>17</sup> Reviewers and program officers should also note that an online methodology is available for fielding the surveys. See the budget justification section of this proposal.

all these items. Drafts of the mass survey questionnaire and as the party expert survey are available for interested readers at <http://www.polsci.uh.edu/hellwig/surveys.pdf>.

Several steps will be taken to develop these questions prior to fielding the studies. First, questionnaire development will benefit from an NSF-funded Time-sharing Experiment for the Social Sciences (TESS) study (Freeman 2005). This study, which was administered to a sample of the American public in February 2005, includes a set of questions on globalization and perceptions of policy control. I am currently performing analyses of the TESS results as part of a coauthored paper presented at the Midwest PSA conference in April 2007. These analyses will effectively serve as a pre-test for the current project. Second, the globalization items will also be pre-tested on a representative sample from Harris County, Texas, using CATI facilities provided by the University of Houston's Center for Public Policy. And third, the instrument will be pre-tested on about 25 respondents in each country. Based on pre-test results, the PI will work with country survey organizations to make appropriate revisions so as to ensure comprehensibility in native language and obtain a level of conceptual equivalence required for cross-national comparisons. After developing the questionnaires during the summer, I anticipate fielding the surveys in the fall of 2008.

**The Expert Survey.** Expert surveys have several advantages over alternative means for measuring party positions, including complete observability of the data, high reliability, known levels of estimation uncertainty, and a relatively low resource commitment.<sup>18</sup> These considerations aside, the expert survey technique is particularly appropriate for studies, such as this one, which require mass and elite policy positions measured along a common metric. The expert survey will be the first to measure party positions specifically on economic globalization, giving it considerable value beyond its immediate purpose. The questionnaire is designed to address Questions 8, 9, and 10 pertaining to party positions and policy representation. It asks experts to rank parties in terms of their positions on economic globalization (broadly conceived), its salience to the party, and the degree of intra-party dissent on the issue. So that the elite survey can be combined with mass surveys to create measures of policy proximity, the questionnaire also asks experts to place parties on left-right ideology, taxation versus spending, social policies, international trade, and European integration (European countries only).

Party experts will be identified initially through the sample used by Druckman and Warwick (2005), association membership directories, bibliographic searches, and referrals from other experts.<sup>19</sup> Following procedures designed to maximize response rate and overall success (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2006, Appendix A), each potential respondent will be sent a cover letter and English-language questionnaire by e-mail. The use of web-based surveys when possible will reduce costs and increase turn around time. Recently conducted expert surveys by Benoit and Laver (2006) and Druckman and Roberts (forthcoming) have demonstrated the utility of web-based surveys.<sup>20</sup> The initial list of contacts will be made in the summer of 2008. Factoring in needed follow-up contacts and referrals, I anticipate to have collected a satisfactory number of surveys by spring of 2009. Following previous expert surveys, I will obtain complete surveys from a minimum of ten experts in each country. The reliability of expert responses will be assessed through inter-item correlations and by correlating them with other expert surveys on shared items (Benoit and Laver 2006; Marks and Steenbergen 1999).

Finally, note that these original data will be analyzed in combination with data on party platforms (Budge *et al.* 2001), institutional variables (Swank *nd*; Golder 2005), and objective measures of economic globalization. This is necessary to augment the survey data with contextual measures and to compare the mostly subjective survey data with the objective indicators typically used in empirical CPE/IPE research.

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<sup>18</sup> Benoit and Laver (2006, ch. 3) provide a recent comparison of the expert survey with its alternatives.

<sup>19</sup> I thank Jamie Druckman for offering to share his list of country experts.

<sup>20</sup> Web surveys can be supplemented with mail surveys where necessary.

### **Data Dissemination and Broader Impacts**

Administering the public opinion surveys will result in a set of ASCII files deposited at the University of Houston (UH) for analysis. Assisted by UH graduate students, the PI will check the data and write codebooks to facilitate secondary data analysis. For the expert survey all data management tasks, electronic and otherwise, will also be performed at UH with graduate student assistance. After the country data sets are finalized, data and full documentation will be deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Once the data are publicly available, scholars will be able to test their theories about connections between globalization and democracy in ways that have not been previously possible. These data, along with reports, refereed articles, and a book which use them, will also benefit classroom instruction in high schools and universities. While “globalization” is frequently mentioned as a defining feature of 21<sup>st</sup> century society, instructors know little beyond anecdotal accounts of how the world economy influences voter perceptions of democracy and popular sovereignty. Studies published in previous decades uncovered relationships between open markets and policy outcomes. We must now move beyond analyses of policy choice to a study of how market integration affects mass politics. Just as earlier works by Cameron (1978), Katzenstein (1985), and Garrett (1998b) did much to separate fact from fiction, findings from this project will close the gap between hyperbole and what the scholarly community and general public actually know about globalization and mass politics.

### **Qualifications of Principal Investigator**

I possess several qualifications relevant to the project. My work on how economic globalization affects government support, policy preferences, and election outcomes has been published in the *Journal of Politics*, *Political Research Quarterly*, and *Comparative Political Studies* and has been invited for revision and resubmission at the *Journal of Politics* and *Electoral Studies*. These papers are presently undergoing revisions. I also have published pieces on comparative economic voting and comparative public policy in the *British Journal of Political Science* and *Social Science History*. I would also call attention to my practical experience in questionnaire design, training and monitoring interviewers, and cleaning data files as student director of the St. Cloud State University Survey. Also relevant is my experience as a researcher at the International Foundation for Election Systems and as an intern at preparing reports from public opinion surveys at the U.S. Information Agency’s Office of Media Reaction.

### **Results of Prior NSF Support**

I have previously received funding from the NSF in the form of a Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant (SES-0241824) entitled “Globalization and Representation in Developed Democracies.” Funds of \$9300 were received from February-September 2003 to assist in the collection of aggregate public opinion and economic data and to interview political elites on how the world economy affects their behavior. Regarding the analysis of public opinion data, I found that exposure to the world economy increases the volatility of aggregate government approval: The globalization of national economies makes politics more complex and, therefore, increases the uncertainty of mass political evaluations. I also found that globalization has a negative effect on evaluations of policymaker confidence. As regards elite interviews, I found that politicians in Britain, Denmark, and France readily perceive globalization to be a constraint on their policy room to maneuver in the economy. This research also revealed differences in mass and elite thinking on globalization: despite recognition by elites, most politicians assert that globalization does not rank as a chief concern among the voters. Results from these funded projects are included in my doctoral dissertation, in a *Political Research Quarterly* article, and in two articles under review.

## BUDGET JUSTIFICATION

### **Section A: Senior Personnel**

#### 2008 Summer Salary

\$7969.00 = 6951.00 of monthly salary plus \$1018.00 in fringe benefits as estimated by University of Houston Division of Research Fringe Benefits Calculator

One-ninth faculty salary support for the summer of 2008 is requested for finalizing the public opinion survey instrument, pre-testing questionnaire items at the University of Houston, overseeing its translation into native languages, and making initial contacts with country experts for the mass survey.

#### 2009 Summer Salary

\$8128.00 = 7089.00 of monthly salary plus \$1039.00 in fringe benefits as estimated by University of Houston Division of Research Fringe Benefits Calculator

One-ninth faculty salary support for the summer of 2009 is requested for disseminating research findings at conferences and through the project website as well as for preparing article and book manuscripts for publication.

### **Section B: Other Personnel**

#### 2008 Summer Salary

\$5116.00 = 4530.00 of estimated 3-month salary plus \$586.00 in fringe benefits as per University of Houston Division of Research Fringe Benefits Calculator

The PI requests summer funds for a graduate student research assistant to help pretest the public opinion survey instrument and to serve as the point-person for contacting party experts and organizing and entering their responses. No funds are requested for assistance during the academic year due research assistance from the University of Houston's Political Science Department.

#### 2009 Summer Salary

\$5199.00 = 4612.00 of estimated 3-month salary plus \$587.00 in fringe benefits as per University of Houston Division of Research Fringe Benefits Calculator

The PI requests summer funds for a graduate student research assistant to help clean the survey data, prepare results reports and data codebooks, conduct data analysis, and serve as webmaster, developing and uploading content to the project website. No funds are requested for assistance during the academic year due research assistance from the University of Houston's Political Science Department.

### **Section G: Other Direct Costs: Probable Survey Service Provider**

Funds are requested for conducting public opinion surveys in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The PI has received quotations from four organizations with competencies in these countries to do telephone-based survey research, Gallup-Europe, IFOP, Ipsos-MORI, and TNS-Sofres. Each of these organizations has solid reputations for doing high quality social science research on public attitudes. Selecting a company with a network in several countries also serves to reduce costs compared to using a set of four individual country-specific firms. Preliminary quotations for performing the study in four countries are as follows.

| Organization  | Quotation in national currency | Quotation in US dollars at current exchange rates |
|---------------|--------------------------------|---|
| Gallup-Europe | €                              | \$  |
| IFOP          | €87,990.00                     | \$114,400.00                                      |
| Ipsos-MORI    | £165,000.00                    | \$320,000.00                                      |
| TNS-Sofres    | €                              | \$  |

Based on the most competitive of these quotes, IFOP is selected as the probable survey service provider. Funds of \$114,400 are requested. These funds cover the costs of conducting surveys of via telephone by native interviewers with local supervising staff to at least 1000 respondents in each of the four countries. Costs for translation, conducting pilot studies, and delivery of data files are also included in the preliminary quotations.

**Total Direct Costs**

|                         |              |
|-------------------------|--------------|
| Senior personnel        | \$16,097.00  |
| Other personnel         | \$10,315.00  |
| Survey Service Provider | \$114,400.00 |
| Total Direct Costs      | \$140,812.00 |

**Opportunities for Adjustments to the Budget**

There are opportunities to make adjustments to the budget request. If deemed necessary, one of the four country cases may be omitted to reduce total direct costs. Costs could also be reduced non-trivially by shortening the length of the survey instrument. Though both measures would affect the scope of the project, it is important to note that these opportunities exist.

Indirect costs are calculated based on modified total direct costs, using the approved institution rate of 48.5%.