

**POLS 6312: Survey of American Institutions and Public Policy**  
**Professor Elizabeth Rigby**  
**Spring 2008**  
**Th 1:00-4:00**  
**Office: PGH 407 (743-3901)**  
**Office Hours: T 2:00-5:00 and by appointment**  
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## **COURSE DESCRIPTION**

This seminar introduces graduate students to several alternative theoretical perspectives related to the study of American institutions, public policy, and the intersection of these two fields. Rather than studying policymaking institutions one-by-one (congress, then judiciary, then executive...) or studying policy areas one-at-a-time (education policy, then welfare policy, then environmental policy...), we will instead focus on cross-cutting themes that bridge these sets of literature. In particular, the seminar will examine how institutional design can alter policy outcomes, how policymakers operate within institutional constraints, the factors promoting policy change, and the ways in which policy choices restructure political institutions and later policy processes. We will apply a range of theoretical approaches for studying these interactive relationships – drawing from both classic arguments and recent empirical innovations.

In the first two weeks of the course, will examine common approaches political scientists take when studying institutions and public policy, as well as the process of policymaking in a democracy. Then, the majority of the course will be devoted to the examination of eight common conceptual frameworks: Historical Institutionalism; Institutional Rational Choice; Multiple Streams; Social Construction and Policy Design; Punctuated Equilibrium; Policy Networks/Advocacy Coalition Framework; Policy Determinants and Outcomes; and Implementation as Policymaking. We will spend a seminar focused on each of these frameworks. For each seminar, we will read one or two chapters providing an overview of the theoretical framework, a series of classic articles key to development of the framework, and two or three (relatively) recent empirical pieces applying the framework to a pressing policy problem. The final weeks of the seminar will be devoted to related topics, including: institutional failure, policy analysis and evaluation, and research design.

## **COURSE REQUIREMENTS**

There are four major requirements for this course. Please note that all written work should be double-spaced, with one inch margins, and otherwise formatted in accordance with the *American Political Science Association Style Manual* (<http://www.wisc.edu/writetest/Handbook/DocAPSA.html>)

***Attendance and Participation (10% of grade).*** As with all graduate seminars, careful reading and analysis of political science literature is the primary course activity. Therefore, regular attendance and participation in discussion is required. If you must be absent for any reason, contact me before the class meeting you are going to miss.

***Analytic Essays (40% of grade).*** Four times during the seminars, each student will prepare and circulate via email (at least 24 hours prior to the seminar) a short (2-3 page) analytic essay addressing how well the empirical examples (marked on syllabus with [E]) serve as exemplars of the framework or topic of

focus in that week's class. These essays should not summarize the readings but instead highlight the key elements of the framework/topic and then critique each of the empirical papers on a few of these elements. In addition, essays should cite at least two of the classic works (marked on syllabus with [C]) assigned for that week.

**Respondent Comments (10% of grade).** In addition, each student will be assigned to serve as a respondent for one of the seminars in which he or she is not writing an analytic essay. The respondent should carefully compare each of the analytic essays prepared for the seminar, summarize them, and highlight points of agreement and disagreement. Respondents should prepare short comments (10 minutes), which will introduce the discussion of the empirical papers worth 5 percent of the grade.

**Research Proposal (40% of grade).** Each student will prepare a 10-15 page research proposal applying the conceptual frameworks, key concepts, and literature from the class to a particular policy issue. This project will be worth 40 percent of your grade although completed in parts as described below.

*Part 1. Policy Case Study due January 31.* You should prepare a 3-4 page case study describing a current policy issue being discussed at the federal, state, or local level. Good sources for information (or links to other sources of information) are [www.publicagendaonline.org](http://www.publicagendaonline.org), or the CQ Researcher series (available in electronic format through the library). I am very flexible about the subject of the case study (gun control, abortion, the death penalty, the Endangered Species Act, the right to die, Social Security, stem cells, etc.). This is worth 5 percent of the course grade.

*Part 2. Concept Paper due April 3.* You should prepare a 5-7 page literature review covering one of the key concepts listed below. Make sure to incorporate at least three of the classic readings into your review of the concept. And conclude the review by identifying two research questions linking the topic of your concept paper to the policy case that you examined in the first assignment. Suppose, for example, your concept paper is on agenda setting and your case study was on immigration policy, then you could develop questions related to the factors supporting or limiting the ascendancy of immigration policy on the policy agenda. This is worth 5 percent of the course grade.

*Key concepts:*

- advocacy coalition framework
- agenda setting
- federalism
- government failure
- historical institutionalism
- implementation
- incrementalism
- institutional design
- institutional rational choice
- issue networks
- market failure
- multiple streams theory
- network governance
- path dependency
- policy analysis and evaluation
- policy design
- policy determinants and outputs
- policy entrepreneur
- policy experimentation and diffusion
- policy feedback
- principal-agent problem
- privatization
- public goods and collective action problem
- punctuated equilibrium
- regulation
- social construction
- target populations

*Part 3. Data and Methods Paper due April 23.* Third, you should research potential methods for addressing the research questions identified in Part 2. What, if any, sources of data are now available (say, through the Michigan data) on your topic? Are there laws and regulations that are relevant? What are standard Census sources, if any? Would your topic require interviewing and if so, who and how? Prepare a 3-4 page data sources and methodology paper summarizing your most promising options and the strengths and limitations of each. Note: At this point, I am not so interested in methodology, in a statistical sense, as I am interested simply in where you might go and what you might do to test your hypotheses proposed in the previous assignment. This is worth 5 percent of the course grade.

*Final Research Proposal due May 5.* Finally, you should present me with a final research proposal (10-15 pages) that presents a theoretically-grounded rationale for the proposed topic, a set of hypotheses drawn from the literature, and description of the research design you would use to test these hypotheses. In the rationale and hypotheses sections, you should make a strong argument to support the existence of this topic as an interesting “puzzle” which needs to be investigated further to inform our understanding of a particular policy area AND our continuous development of theories regarding political institutions and the policy process. In the research design section, it is not assumed that you have any original data or secondary data to analyze. Instead, it is assumed that you have thought about the kinds of data and research methodologies that would allow you to test your hypotheses. In some ways this is a synthesis of the three prior papers. Therefore, it should be unnecessary to start from scratch on this final paper. However, it is essential that you integrate your previous papers into a coherent whole and rethink the argument and logic of the final paper. This is worth 25 percent of the course grade.

## **COURSE SCHEDULE**

### ***Introduction to Institutions and Policy***

- January 17      Conceptual Models for the Study of Institutions and Public Policy
- January 24      Democratic Institutions and Policy Outcomes  
Analytic Essays: To be assigned (TBA)  
Respondent: TBA

### ***Common Conceptual Frameworks***

- January 31      Historical Institutionalism [Case Study Due]  
Analytic Essays: TBA  
Respondent: TBA
- February 7      Institutional Rational Choice  
Analytic Essays: TBA  
Respondent: TBA
- February 14      Multiple Streams  
Analytic Essays: TBA  
Respondent: TBA
- February 21      Social Construction and Policy Design  
Analytic Essays: TBA  
Respondent: TBA

February 28	Punctuated Equilibrium Analytic Essays: TBA Respondent: TBA
March 6	Policy Networks & Advocacy Coalition Framework Analytic Essays: TBA Respondent: TBA
March 13	Policy Determinants and Outcomes Analytic Essays: TBA Respondent: TBA
March 20	SPRING BREAK
March 27	Implementation as Policymaking Analytic Essays: TBA Respondent: TBA
April 3	Comparing across Frameworks [Concept Paper Due]

### ***Special Topics***

April 10	Institutional Failure: Markets, Government, and the Voluntary Sector Analytic Essays: TBA Respondent: TBA
April 16	Policy Analysis and Evaluation Analytic Essays: TBA Respondent: TBA
April 23	Research Design [Data and Methodology Paper Due]
May 5	No class [Final Research Proposal Due]

### **READINGS**

Many of the reading will be drawn from one three books available in the bookstore:

- Paul Sabatier, ed., *Theories of the Policy Process [Second edition]*
- Jay Shafritz, Karen S. Layne, and Christopher P. Borick, eds. *Classics of Public Policy*
- Kenneth N. Bickers and John T. Williams. *Public Policy Analysis: A Political Economy Approach.*

Additional readings will be provided on a CD, although nearly all are available through JSTOR or other electronic journal databases.

## READING SCHEDULE

[C] = classic paper

[E] = empirical example

### January 17. Conceptual Models for the Study of Institutions and Public Policy

[C] Graham T. Allison. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *APSR*, Excerpt in Shafritz et al, 2005.

### January 24. Democratic Institutions and Policy Outcomes

Bickers and Williams, Chapter 2, "Democratic Governance and Public Policy" and Chapter 3, "Forms of Democracy and Implications for Public Policy"

[C] Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz. 1962. "The Two Faces of Power," *APSR*.

[C] Giandomenico Majone. 1989. *Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process*. New Haven, CT; Yale University Press. Read Chap 5 "Changing Institutional Constraints."

[E] Mark A. Peterson. 2005. "The Congressional Graveyard for Health Care Reform." In James A. Morone and Lawrence R. Jacobs, eds. *Healthy, Wealthy, and Fair: Health Care and the Good Society* (p. 205-233). New York: Oxford University Press.

[E] Michael B. Berkman and Eric Plutzer. 2005. *Ten Thousand Democracies: Politics and Public Opinion in America's School Districts*. Read Preface, Chapter 4 "Direct Democracy, Indirect Democracy, and Policy Responsiveness," and Chapter 5 "Voting Rights, Electoral Systems, and Policy Responsiveness."

### January 31. Historical Institutionalism [Paper Part 1 Due]

Karen Orren and Steve Skowronek. 2002. "The Study of American Political Development," in Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, eds., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002)

[C] Charles A. Beard. 1913. *Economic Interpretation of the Constitutions*. In Shafritz et al. 2005.

[C] Peter Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies* 44: 936-57.

[C] Paul Pierson. 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *APSR* 94(2):251-267

[E] Robert C. Lieberman. 2005. *Shaping Race Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1 "Configurations of Race and State" and Chapter 5 "Encounters with the Welfare State: Social Security and Social Insurance"

[E] Andrea Campbell. 2003. *How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare State*. Read Chapter 1 “Introduction” and Chapter 4 “Senior Citizen Participation and Policy over Time.”

## **February 7. Institutional Rational Choice**

Elinor Ostrom, “Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework.” In Sabatier, 2007.

Bickers and Williams, Chapter 4. “The Problem of Collective Action”

Olsen, Johan P. 2008. “Understanding Institutions and the Logics of Appropriateness.” In *Understanding Organizations*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

[C] Garrett Hardin. 1968. “Tragedy of the Commons.” *Science*, 162:1243-1248. In Shafritz et al, 2005.

[C] Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom. 1971. “Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration.” *Public Administration Review*, 31(2):203-216.

[E] Mark Lubell; Mark Schneider; John T. Scholz; Mihriye Mete. Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of Collective Action Institutions. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 1. (Jan., 2002), pp. 148-163.

[E] Mark Hallerberg; Patrik Marier Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 3. (Jul., 2004), pp. 571-587.

## **February 14. Multiple Streams**

Nikolaos Zahariadis, “The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations, Prospects.” In Sabatier, 2007.

[C] Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder. 1972. *The Dynamics of Agenda-Building*. Excerpt in Shafritz et al, 2005.

[C] John Kingdon. 1995. *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, Excerpt in Shafritz et al, 2005.

[E] Robert S. Wood. 2006. “Tobacco’s Tipping Point: The Master Settlement Agreement as a Focusing Event.” *The Policy Studies Journal*, 34 (3).

[E] Joshua Farley et al., 2007. “Opening the Policy Window for Ecological Economics: Katrina as a Focusing Event.” *Ecological Economics*, 63(2/3), p. 344-354.

[E] Karen Evans Stout and Byron Stevens. 2000. “The Case of the Failed Diversity Rule: A Multiple Streams Analysis.” *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, 22(4):341-355

[E] James Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. "Dynamic Representation," *APSR*

## February 21. Social Construction and Policy Design

Helen Ingram, Anne L. Schneider, and Peter deLeon, "Social Construction and Policy Design." In Sabatier, 2007.

Bickers and Williams Chapter 8 "Politics and Policy Choice"

[C] Theodore J. Lowi. 1963-1964. "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory." *World Politics* 16:45, 677-715. Excerpt in Shafritz et al, 2005.

[C] George Orwell. 1950. "Politics and English Language." From *Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays*. Harcourt, Inc. Excerpt in Shafritz et al, 2005.

[C] Murray Edelman. 1964. "Symbols and Political Quiescence." From *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*. Excerpt in Shafritz et al, 2005.

[C] Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram. 1990 "Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools," *JOP* 52:510-27.

[C] Paul Pierson. 1993. "When Effect becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change" *World Politics*, 45(4):595-628.

[E] Adam J. Berinsky and Donald R. Kinder. 2006. "Making Sense of Issues through Media Frames: Understanding the Kosovo Crisis." *JOP*, Volume 68(3)

[E] Joe Soss. 2005. "Making Clients and Citizens: Welfare Policy as a Source of Status, Belief, and Action." In Anne L. Schneider and Helen M. Ingram (Eds.). *Deserving and Entitled: Social Constructions and Public Policy* (p. 291-328). Albany: State University of New York Press.

[E] Lina Newton. 2005. "It is Not a Question of Being Anti-immigration": Categories of Deservedness in Immigration Policy Making. P. 139-167. In Anne L. Schneider and Helen M. Ingram (Eds.). *Deserving and Entitled: Social Constructions and Public Policy* (p. 213-328). Albany: State University of New York Press.

## February 28. Punctuated Equilibrium

James L. True, Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner, "Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking." In Sabatier, 2007.

[C] Charles E. Lindblom. 1959. "The Science of Muddling Through." *Public Administration Review*. In Shafritz et al, 2005.

[C] Anthony Downs. 1972. "Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue-Attention Cycle." *The Public Interest*, 28:38-50. In Shafritz et al, 2005.

[C] Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. *Agenda and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Read Chapter 11: "Federalism as a System of Policy Venues."

[E] Robert S. Wood. 2006. "The Dynamics of Incrementalism: Subsystems, Politics and Public Lands." *The Policy Studies Journal*, 34, 1

[E] Christian Breunig and Chris Koski. 2006. "Punctuated Equilibria and Budgets in the American States." *The Policy Studies Journal*.

[E] Kenneth Meier et al. 2007. "Explaining Policy Punctuations: Bureaucratic Centralization, Organizational Size and the Punctuated Equilibrium." *AJPS*, 50, 140-150.

### **March 6. Policy Networks**

Silke Adam and Hanspeter Kriesi, "The Network Approach" In Sabatier, 2007.

Carlsson, Lars. 2000. "Policy Networks as Collective Action." *PSJ* 28(3)502-

Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications." In Sabatier, 2007.

[C] Hugh Hecl. 1978. "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in Anthony King, ed. *The New American Political System*.

[C] Jack L. Walker. 1983. "The Origin and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America," *APSR*.

[E] Shannon Orr. 2006. "Policy Subsystems and Climate Change." *The Policy Studies Journal*, 34(2).

[E] Isabella Alcaniz. 2007. "*Bureaucratic Networks and Government Spending: A Network Analysis of Nuclear Collaboration in Latin America*"

[E] Mark Lubell. 2007. "Familiarity Breeds Trust: Collective Action in a Policy Domain." *JOP*, 69(1).

[E] Christopher M. Weible. 2006. "An Advocacy Coalition Framework Approach to Stakeholder Analysis: Understanding the Political Context of California Marine Protected Area Policy." *JPART*. 17(1):95-117.

### **March 13. Policy Determinants and Policy Outputs**

Frances Stokes Berry and William D. Berry. "Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research." In Sabatier, 2007.

William Blomquist. "The Policy Process and Large-*N* Comparative Studies."

Bickers and Williams, Chapter 8. "Policy Analysis in the American Political Context."

[C] David Easton. 1965. "A Political System Under Stress" excerpted from *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. Excerpt in Shafritz et al, 2005.

[C] Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson. 1963. "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," *JOP*, 265-89.

[C] Jack L. Walker. 1969. "The Diffusion of Innovation among the American States," *APSR* 63:880-99.

[C] Paul Peterson and Mark Rom. 1989. "American Federalism, Welfare Policy, and Residential Choices," *APSR* 83:711-28.

[E] Craig Volden. 2006. "States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children's Health Insurance Program." *AJPS*.

[E] Neal D. Woods. 2006. "Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis." *SSQ*, 87(1):174-189.

[E] Michael Crow. 2006. "Overcoming City Limits: Vertical and Horizontal Models of Local Redistributive Policy Making." *SSQ*, 87(2):361-379.

[E] Robert C. Turner and Mark K. Cassell. 2007. "When do States Pursue Targeted Economic Development Policies? The Adoption and Expansion of State Enterprise Zone Programs." *SSQ*, 88(1): 86-103.

### **March 27. Implementation as Policymaking**

Rick Matland. 1995. "Synthesizing the Implementation Literature." *JPART*, 5(2) 145.

Bickers and Williams, Chapter 10, "Bureaucracy"

Gary Miller. 2005. "The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models." *American Review of Political Science*.

[C] Paul Sabatier, "Top Down and Bottom Up Approaches to Implementation Research," *Journal of Public Policy*, 6:21-48.

[C] Michael Lipsky. 1980. *Street Level Bureaucrats as Policy Makers*. Excerpt in Shafritz et al, 2005.

[E] Meyer, Marcia, Bonnie Glaser and Karin Mac Donald. 1998. "On the Front Lines of Welfare Delivery: Are Workers Implementing Policy Reform." *JPAM*, 17(1) 1-22.

[E] Lael R. Keiser, Peter R. Mueser and Seung Whan Choi. 2004. "Race, Bureaucratic Discretion and the Implementation of Welfare Reform," *APSR* 48:314-27.

[E] Kenneth J. Meier, Laurence J. O'Toole Jr, and Sean Nicholson-Crotty. 2004. "Multilevel Governance and Organizational Performance: Investigating the Political-Bureaucratic Labyrinth." *JPAM*, 23, 1, 31-47.

[E] Michael Alvarez and Thad Hall. 2006. "Controlling Democracy: The Principal-Agent Problem in Election Administration." *Policy Studies Journal* 34, 4, 491-510.

### **April 3. Comparing across Frameworks [Paper Part 2 Due]**

Edella Schlager, "A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories, and Models of Policy Processes." In Sabatier, 2007.

Paul A. Sabatier, "Fostering the Development of Policy Theory." In Sabatier, 2007.

### **April 10. Institutional Failure: Markets, Government, and Voluntary Sector**

Bickers and Williams, Chapter 6 "The Market as a Collective Action Mechanism" and Chapter 7 "Limitations on the Market"

Julian Le Grand. 1991. "The Theory of Government Failure." *British Journal of Political Science*, 21, 4: 423-442.

[C] Milton Friedman, 1962. *Capitalism and Freedom*, Read p. 7-37.

[C] Lester Thurow. 1985. *The Zero-sum Society*. Excerpt in Shafritz et al, 2005.

[C] Alvert O. Hirschman. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Read Chapter 1: Introduction.

[C] Arthur M. Okun. 1975. *Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade-Off*. Read Chapter 4: Increasing Equality in an Efficient Economy.

[C] David L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining. 2005. *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. Read Chapter 9: Policy Problems as Market and Government Failure: The Madison Taxi-cab Policy Analysis Example.

[E] John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe. 1988. "Politics, Markets and the Organization of Schools," *APSR*.

[E] Donald Kettl, *System under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., chapter 3 "Reshaping the Bureaucracy"

[E] Ingrid Ellen Gould, Amy Ellen Schwartz, Ioan Voicu, and Michael Schill. 2007. "Does Federally Subsidized Rental Housing Depress Neighborhood Property Values?" *JPAM*, 26(2):257-281.

### **April 16. Policy Analysis and Evaluation**

Bickers and Williams Chapter 11 "Analyzing Proposed Policies" and Chapter 12 "Evaluating Existing Policies"

David L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining. 2005. *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. Read Chapters 1 and 2.

Druckman, James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. 2006. "The Growth and Development of Experimental Research in Political Science." *American Political Science Review*, 100(4):627-636.

[C] Charles Lindbloom. 1990. *Inquiry and Change*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Read Chapter 9. "What Can Social Scientists Do?"

[C] Donald T. Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments," *American Psychologist*.

[C] Arnold J. Meltsner. 1976. *The Seven Deadly Sins of Policy Analysis*. Excerpt in Shafritz et al, 2005.

[C] Aaron Wildavsky. 1979. *The Art of Policy Analysis*. Excerpt in Shafritz et al, 2005.

[E] Gregory Weiher and Kent L. Tedin. 2002. "Does Choice Lead to Racially Distinctive Schools? Charter Schools and Household Preferences?" *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 21:79-92.

[E] Melissa R. Michelson. 2006. "Mobilizing the Latino Youth Vote: Some Experimental Results." *SSQ*, 87(1):1188-1206.

[E] Noel Campbell and R. Zachary Finney. 2005. "Mitigating the Combined Distributional Consequences of the Georgia Lottery for Education and the HOPE Scholarship." *SSQ*, 86(3): 746-758.

### **April 23. Research Design [Paper Part 3 Due]**

W. Phillips Shively. 2002. *The Craft of Political Research, 5<sup>th</sup> Edition*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Read: Chapter 2 "Political Theories and Research Topics" and Chapter 6 "Causal Thinking and the Design of Research"

### **May 5. Final Papers due [No class]**